Fiduciary Standards as Applied Under ERISA by Orr, Rosemary B.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 7 | Number 2 Article 6
1979
Fiduciary Standards as Applied Under ERISA
Rosemary B. Orr
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Retirement Security Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rosemary B. Orr, Fiduciary Standards as Applied Under ERISA, 7 Fordham Urb. L.J. 377 (1979).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol7/iss2/6
FIDUCIARY STANDARDS AS APPLIED UNDER
ERISA
I. Introduction
In 1974 Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA),' which effected significant changes in the law
governing the private pension industry. In view of the size of this
industry, which by 1980 will comprise more than two hundred bil-
lion dollars representing the pension assets of some forty-two million
employees,2 these changes are of considerable importance not only
for the employees whose assets are affected but also for the Ameri-
can economy generally.
Seeking to secure financial integrity in the private pension indus-
try,3 ERISA's framers struck at abuses that had long pervaded the
management of pension assets.' Central to this reform program are
provisions regulating the functions of pension trustees, who control
the investment of the assets of the pension plans. 5
The relationship of trustee and trust beneficiaries has historically
been characterized as a fiduciary one.' Resting on the trust instru-
ment as supplemented by various statutory provisions and common
law principles,' the trustee's position is one of personal confidence;
his responsibilities may not be delegated.8 These responsibilities
include preserving trust property, maintaining its productivity, and
pressing valid claims on its behalf. As a fiduciary, the trustee must
account for his actions on a regular basis, and he must exercise the
care and skill of a reasonably prudent person.'
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 26, 29, 31, & 42 of the United States Code)
[hereinafter cited as ERISA].
2. S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 119741 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS
4890, 4891.
3. Renfrew, Fiduciary Responsibilities under the Pension Reform Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 1829,
1831 (1977).
4. Reference is made to such abuses as self-dealing, imprudent investments, and misap-
propriation of plan funds. Statement by the Hon. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., chairman of the
Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare upon introducing the Conf. Rep. on H.R. 2,
reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5186.
5. ERISA §§ 401-32, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-32 (1974).
6. A. LORING, A TRUSTEE's HANDBOOK (1962).
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id.
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These usual requirements notwithstanding, trustees have often
vitiated their fiduciary obligations by inserting exculpatory or in-
demnification provisions into the governing trust instruments.
Courts have generally enforced these clauses to the extent that they
insulated the trustee from liability for acts and omissions not char-
acterized by gross neglect, willfull misconduct, or lack of good
faith.'0 As a result, beneficiaries have often been without effective
recourse against their fiduciaries-a problem that ERISA was in-
tended to remedy in the area of private pensions by enhancing the
stringency of fiduciary requirements for pension trustees. ERISA's
fiduciary provisions proscribe the use of exculpatory clauses," per-
mit the use of qualified indemnification clauses,' 2 identify certain
transactions in which pension trustees are prohibited from engag-
ing,'3 and delineate standards to which these trustees must adhere.'"
This Comment will primarily examine judicial interpretation of
these provisions. It will als9 address their relation to several clauses
in the Taft-Hartley Act. As a prelude to this discussion, however,
this Comment will review the statutory language of the fiduciary
provisions of ERISA.
II. Statutory Language
ERISA requires that pension plans subject to its provisions be
established in trust form.' 5 A written agreement must be drawn
naming, among other things, the fiduciary who will manage and
control the plan.'" Thus one must initially determine who is a fidu-
ciary.
ERISA's definition of a fiduciary encompasses two categories of
individuals: those who render investment advice for a fee and those
who have discretionary control or management over the plan or its
assets.'7 To qualify as a fiduciary it is essential that a person possess
10. J. Fuller, Fiduciary Liability Insurance, N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation, An-
nual Conference on ERISA (1977).
11. ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (Supp. IV 1974).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
14. Id. § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
15. Id. § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
16. Id. § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
17. Id. § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) reads as follows:
(21)(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretion-
[Vol. VII
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a requisite degree of discretion,'8 for those who merely perform cer-
tain routine administrative or ministerial functions do not assume
fiduciary status. 9 There are usually several people who exercise
discretionary authority over every pension plan established;
ERISA's definition of a fiduciary is, therefore, very broad"" Pension
fund administrators in the past were not always subject to common
law trust principles and those who were found various means by
which to vitiate their fiduciary responsibilities.' Congress enacted
this broad definition of a fiduciary in order to ensure that all persons
who had the requisite discretionary dealings with pension assets
would conduct themselves with the utmost integrity, be answerable
to the beneficiaries, and be accountable for any breach of the obliga-
tions they had assumed."
A person who qualifies as a fiduciary under ERISA assumes many
duties and faces enormous potential personal liability for the breach
of those duties. These duties must be discharged solely in the inter-
est2 of and for the exclusive benefit 4 of plan participants and bene-
ficiaries.
ary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has
any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of
such plan. Such term includes any person designated under section 405(c)(1)(B) [29
U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1)(B)].
Id.
18. However, Congress made it clear that fiduciary status was not to be conferred where
the discretionary control rested with the participants themselves; e.g., where a participant
has sole discretion over an individual account established in his name. S. REP. No. 93-127,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RErIR.
MENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 615 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORYI.
19. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Question D-2 (1978).
20. For a discussion of who may be considered a fiduciary, see Little & Thrailkill,
Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1977).
21. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 18, at 615.
22. Id. Common law fiduciary principles developed in the context of testamentary and
inter vivos trusts with their attendant emphasis on fulfilling the directions of the settlor. Thus
the settlor's direction that a fiduciary be insulated from liability for wrongdoings was gener-
ally enforced. Congress felt that fiduciary principles and procedures developed in that context
were not sufficient guidelines for trustees in the pension field and, therefore, drafted the more
stringent provisions of ERISA.
23. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) reads as follows:
(a)(1) [A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
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In order to equip a participant with the necessary means to pro-
tect his pension rights, Congress included reporting and disclosure
provisions so that the participant could easily acquire information
about his pension plan.2" Congress also established a fiduciary stan-
dard by which a participant could measure a fiduciary's actions.2'
This standard is contained in section 404 (a)(1)(B) and requires that
a fiduciary discharge his duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
[person] acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims."" Congress expected the courts to interpret this
"prudent person" standard bearing in mind the special nature and
purpose of employee benefit plans.28
Fiduciaries are forbidden to engage in certain transactions which
are enumerated in section 406.29 Congress intended this list of pro-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so;
and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions
of this title.
Id.
24. Id. § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i).
25. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1973), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 18, at 615.
26. Although in the text of the Act this is denominated as the "prudent man" standard,
this Comment will refer to it as the "prudent person" standard.
27. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). For full text see note 23 supra.
28. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HsToRY, supra note 18, at 4569.
29. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in section 408 [29 U.S.C. § 1108]:
(1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a transac-
tion, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect-
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between the plan and a party
in interest;
(B) lending of money or other extension of credit between the plan and a party
in interest;
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hibited transactions to represent the most serious misconduct in
which pension fiduciaries have engaged in the past. 30 A fiduciary
will incur liability for engaging in a prohibited transaction only if
he knew or should have known that the transaction was prohibited.3'
Application of the prudent person standard will determine whether
a fiduciary should have known that a transaction was prohibited."
The extent of the investigation necessary to satisfy this prudence
test will vary depending on the circumstances.
Section 408 provides a means by which a fiduciary can obtain an
exemption from the prohibited transaction provisions of section
406.1 This exemption clause gives the fiduciary greater flexibility if
he finds a transaction proscribed by section 406 would prove benefi-
cial to the participants and beneficiaries of his pension plan.34
ERISA provides an array of sanctions which may be invoked if a
fiduciary breaches his duties under ERISA. Civil penalties35 include
personal liability to make good any losses the plan incurred as a
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in
interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, of any assets
of the plan; or
(E) acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any employer security or employer
real property in violation of section 407(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)].
(2) No fiduciary who has authority or discretion to control or manage the assets of a
plan shall permit the plan to hold any employer security or employer real property if
he knows or should know that holding such security or real property violates section
407(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)].
(b) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not-
(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any transaction involving the plan
on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests
of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries, or
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing
with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan.
Id.
30. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1973), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY,
supra note 18, at 4573. "[Wlhile the magnitude of these improper practices is small in
relation to the total number of plans in existence, the seriousness of the improper practices
disclosed indicates the need for additional precautions to insure that these specific examples
do not become general conditions." H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4651.
31. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 4573.
32. Id. at 4574.
33. ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (1974).
34. See notes 85-95 infra and accompanying text.
35; ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1974).
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result of the breach and a restoration of profits which the fiduciary
may have made as a result of the breach. Criminal sanctions 3 in-
clude a fine or imprisonment or both. Moreover, an excise tax37 may
be levied upon a fiduciary who engages in a prohibited transaction.
These broad fiduciary provisions form a yardstick by which the
federal courts have measured fiduciary action in the private pension
field.
III. Judicial Interpretations of ERISA's Fiduciary Provisions
A. Preliminary Issues
Litigation 38 involving fiduciary obligations under ERISA will nec-
essarily raise the threshold question of the precise scope of the Act,
that is, to whom do these requirements apply.
Section 3 of ERISA defines the word fiduciary to include any
person who exercises discretionary authority or control over the
management of the plan or the disposition of the assets. A fiduciary
is also one who has discretionary authority or responsibility in the
plan's administration or who has authority or responsibility to ren-
der investment advice to the plan for a fee. 39
Fiduciary status entails a host of obligations that are both strin-
gent and conscientiously enforced. Because of the burden of these
concomitant obligations, fiduciary status is not lightly conferred.
Existence of fiduciary status was the major issue before a Califor-
nia district court in Hibernia Bank v.' International Brotherhood of
36. Id. § 431, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1974).
37. 26 U.S.C. § 4975. A fiduciary will not be subject to an excise tax unless he participates
in a prohibited transaction in another disqualified person capacity.
38. Although parties who bring an action pursuant to ERISA clearly have standing to sue
in federal court, ERISA does not envision a lawsuit as the only means by which to settle a
controversy which arises under its provisions. This was the holding of a federal district court
in Feagan v. Lang, 416 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1976). Plaintiff trustees brought an action
against an individual carpenter as employer for delinquent contributions to the pension fund.
Although out of court settlement had been considered, plaintiff trustees, as fiduciaries, were
concerned that any out of court settlement which involved a compromise of amounts allegedly
due would subject them to liability under ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(B), 405(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§
1104(a)(1)(B), 1105(a)(2) for failure to maximize fund assets. The district court while render-
ing judgment for the plaintiffs held that ERISA contemplates amicable resolutions of dis-
putes for "[pirudent persons do compromise their position in appropriate circumstances."
416 F. Supp. at 54. In Judge Roettger's view this would have been an appropriate case for
out of court settlement.
39. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). See notes 17-22 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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Teamsters.40 Hibernia Bank was suing4' for losses exceeding
$700,000 that it incurred when the Teamsters Security Fund failed
to repay overdrafts in its commercial account with the bank.4 ' The
bank brought suit under ERISA, relying on its status as a fidu-
ciary.4 3 Rejecting the bank's basic premise, the court drew a distinc-
tion between a fiduciary and a custodian. Under ERISA, a fiduciary
must possess the requisite discretionary authority either by having
control of the management of the plan or control of the management
or disposition of the assets of the plan." The district court concluded
that the bank, merely serving in its capacity as a repository of plan
assets, was not to be deemed a fiduciary. 5 The court's declination
to view Hibernia Bank as a fiduciary was fatal to the suit, since the
bank's standing to sue was premised on its status as such.4" Accord-
ingly, the case was dismissed."
Although the definition of a fiduciary under ERISA was broadly
drawn, it is nevertheless essential that the criteria enumerated
therein be strictly observed. The court's unwillingness to readily
grant fiduciary status was prudent in light of the fact that enormous
potential for liability accrues with the conferral of that status.
Courts that have reviewed conduct challenged under the fiduciary
provisions of ERISA have limited their scope of review to the ques-
40. 411 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
41. The defendants were the Teamsters Union, one of its local unions, two of its joint
councils and trustees of the Teamsters Security Fund.
42. 411 F. Supp. at 481.
43. The court dismissed the bank's contention that it also had standing to sue under the
Labor Management Relations Act. Id. at 488.
44. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). The Hibernia Bank claimed it was a
fiduciary as a result of its agency relationship with the trustees of the pension plan, who were
acknowledged fiduciaries. The court rejected this proposition as there was no evidence that
the bank had any discretionary authority. The relationship between the bank and trustees
was precisely set out in their agreement in which the trustees directed the bank to perform
seven basic duties none of which were discretionary. 411 F. Supp. at 489-90.
45. The bank'also claimed that ERISA recognized a custodian as a fiduciary. This claim
was rejected although the court acknowledged that a custodian could also be a fiduciary, if
the custodian possessed the requisite discretionary authority and control. 411 F. Supp. at 490.
46. Four categories of persons are entitled to sue under ERISA. They are: (1) Secretary
of Labor, (2) participants in ERISA trusts, (3) beneficiaries of ERISA trusts, or (4) fiduciaries
of ERISA trusts. ERISA § 432, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1974). The court disposed quickly of the
bank's claim that it was a beneficiary. As to the bank's claim that it was a fiduciary see note
44 supra.
47. The district court may have been more disposed to perceive Hibernia Bank as a
fiduciary if the bank had taken action that compromised or endangered the plan assets which
resulted in detrimental consequences for the plan participants.
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tion of whether the fiduciary acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad
faith." They have declined to consider whether the trustees con-
ducted themselves as ideal trustees or as the courts themselves
would have acted in like circumstances.
In Bueneman v. Pension Fund,49 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit considered whether a district court had applied the
appropriate standard of review for actions involving violations of
fiduciary duty. Everett Bueneman, a truck driver, sued the trustees
of his union's pension fund after his claim for a pension had been
denied. 0 The trustees of the pension fund denied Bueneman's claim
for a pension after they ascertained that the plaintiff's employer,
Jim's Express, Inc., had not made payments to the fund during the
plaintiff's employment. As a result Jim's Express was not an em-
ployer as that term was defined by the plan instrument. Since Jim's
Express was not an employer, Bueneman's claim was barred."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri had inquired as to the reasons for the denial of the pension as
well as the trustees' past practice when confronted with similar
circumstances. It found that the trustees consistently denied retro-
active coverage and retroactive employer participation.52 The dis-
trict court also examined the participation agreement and found its
terms were in accordance with the trustees' action.53 The trustees'
48. See notes 49-59 infra and accompanying text. This standard was also applied in non-
ERISA cases. See, e.g., Norton v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 553 F.2d 1352, 1356 (D.C. Cir.
1977), where the court held that the union pension fund's denial of retirement benefits to
plaintiff was arbitrary and capricious since the denial was based on the fact that other
employees had chosen another union and in view of the fact that the plaintiffs rights had
fully matured and vested.; see also Rehmas v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976), a
suit brought to compel payment of survivor's benefits allegedly due. The Rehmas court used
the arbitrary or capricious standard in reviewing the trustees' action saying: "We find this
standard of judicial review, which leads neither to abdication of traditional judicial control
of fiduciaries nor to excessive judicial intervention in trust operations, in harmony with
federal labor policy." 555 F.2d at 1371. This standard of review was also applied in pre-ERISA
cases also. See, e.g., Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1962) where the court held
that the trustees had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying retirement benefits to an
employee when the trustees based their decision on the fact that the employee had not
complied with a resolution which was not in existence when the employee's application was
filed.
49. 97 L.R.R.M. 2745 (8th Cir. 1978).
50. Id. at 2746.
51. Id.
52. This denial of retroactive participation was based on a desire "to achieve economic
stability in order to maintain maximum earning potential for the fund." Id. at 2747.
53. Id. The participation agreement to which both the company and union were parties,
explicitly stated that it would not be binding upon the fund until the trustee accepted it.
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consistent policy regarding retroactive participation coupled with
the explicit language of the participation agreement convinced the
district court that the trustees had not acted capriciously or arbi-
trarily in denying the pension.5' The trustees denial of the pension
was therefore upheld.55
The court of appeals reviewed the lower court's decison and af-
firmed its ruling that a reviewing court is "limited to determining
whether [the trustee's] action has been arbitrary or capricious, or
an abuse of discretion."5 The court of appeals concluded that the
district court had chosen the appropriate standard5" and applied it
properly."
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and Ninth Circuits have applied substantially equivalent standards
of review to fiduciary actions."
B. Substantive Requirements
1. Prudent Person Standard
The prudent person standard" was established to guide the fidu-
ciary in the discharge of his duties and to provide the beneficiary
with a means by which to measure the fiduciary's actions.
In Morrissey v. Curran' the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied this prudent person standard to a trustee's actions
and found them unacceptable. The pension fund in question was
established prior to the enactment of ERISA, and the original trus-
tees improperly administered the plan by using plan assets for their
personal use and by making improper investments.2 Denying liabil-
ity for wrongs perpetrated prior to the enactment of ERISA, the
defendant who was the current trustee, contended that ERISA was
not retroactive. 3 The court found that the violation occurred when
the trustee, following the enactment of ERISA, did not dispose of
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2745.
56. Id. at 2746.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2747.
59. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
61. 567 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1977).
62. Id. at 547.
63. Id. at 548.
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the inherited imprudent investment within a reasonable time.". Re-
tention of that investment was unwise and inconsistent with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence that would be used by a prudent
person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters. 5
The prudent person rule was also the cornerstone of the decision
in Eaves v. Penn."6 Here the owners of Glen's Inc., who were also
trustees of the restaurant's pension plan, sold some of their stock to
a third party after agreeing to resign as trustees of the plan and
designate as successors persons selected by the buyer. 7 The succes-
sor trustee converted the plan to an Employee Stock Ownership
Plan, which then purchased the remaining stock of the restaurant."
The district court found, inter alia, that all trustees have a duty
to act as prudent persons, and the trustees of the restaurant had
failed to act as such.69 This court used its broad remedial powers to
rescind the transaction, restore lost profits and income to the plan,
and appoint a trustee of its own choosing in order to preserve the
interests of the plan beneficiaries.7 ° Writing for the court, Judge
Thompson confined his ruling to the facts of the case at hand. He
noted that it might not always be imprudent for a retirement plan
to use its cash assets to invest in qualified employer securities but
that "the effect of such action in this particular case, and the man-
ner in which that decision was made and carried out . . . is clearly
violative of the protections intended to be derived from ERISA."'
These cases demonstrate that the prudent person rule is a flexible
tool for ensuring the preservation of the rights and interests of bene-
ficiaries. It is not the decision in isolation which must be judged but
the decision in the context in which it-arises, with all its attendant
ramifications and implications. At present the federal courts show
no tendency to bar all instances of particular transactions per se;
instead, they appear to inquire whether given transactions are inap-
64. Id. at 548-49.
65. Id. at 548-49 & n.8.
66. 426 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
67. Id. at 833.
68. Id. at 834-35.
69. This was a violation of ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Id. at
836-37.
70. 426 F. Supp. at 838.
71. Id. The original trustees made no effort to ascertain the quality or credentials of their
successor trustees. They acted not in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries but
in the interest of the purchaser of the restaurant. When converting the plan to an ESOP the
successor trustees were oblivious to the effect of that change on the plan and its participants.
[Vol. VII
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propriate in light of their surrounding circumstances." Regrettably,
the dearth of rulings in this area make any future predictions impos-
sible. There are several pending lawsuits,73 however, in which the
plaintiffs allege violations by fiduciaries of the prudent person stan-
dard and failure to act solely in the interests of plan participants;"
the decisions in these cases will doubtless shed further light on the
shape which the federal judiciary will give to the prudent person
standard.
2. Prohibited Actions
ERISA not only provides the fiduciary with a standard by which
to guide his actions but also enumerates certain transactions in
which the fiduciary is forbidden to engage in the absence of a spe-
cific exemption.7 5
In Marshall v. Snyder' the defendants flagrantly violated
ERISA's prohibition of transactions involving the furnishing of
goods, services or facilities between the plan and a party in inter-
est.77 The trustees' actions were inappropriate to the extent that
they were responsible for "causing and permitting the improper
expenditure of plan assets and making payments. . . far in excess
of any reasonable expense of administering plans of this size and
kind."7
72. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text.
73. The following cases are presently pending in the federal courts: Usery v. Whatley, CA
No. N 6004 A (E.D. Va.) (Department of Labor has alleged that by converting the plan to
an ESOP without adequately considering effects this change would have on plan and its
participants, defendant trustees acted imprudently and in their own interests); Marshall v.
DeKeyser, CA No. 77 C 276 (W.D. Wis.) (newly appointed trustees of plan allegedly violated
prudent person rule by failing to rectify previous trustees' improper investment decisions
which included making inadequately secured or unsecured loans of virtually all plan's assets
to employer); Harris v. Tappan Co., C-77-192 (N.D. Ohio) (trustees' fiduciary duties allegedly
breached by failure to correct improper action by prior investment manager); Marshall v.
Edison Brothers Stores Pension Plan, No. 77-0894C(1) (E.D. Mo.) (fiduciaries breached
ERISA § 404 by denying to two plan participants benefits to which they were entitled);
Marshall v. Deep South Electric, Inc., CA No. 77-1079 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (violation of prudent
person rule for making improper loan which was inadequately secured to party in interest,
and for failure to enforce valid claims for repayment of loans); O'Neill v. Marriott Corp., CA
No. M-77-495 (D. Md.) (breach of fiduciary duty alleged for investing plan assets in qualify-
ing employer securities which was in the best interests of the plan sponsor and not the plan
participants).
74. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
75. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
76. 430 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
77. The party in interest with whom the business was transacted was the union.
78. 430 F. Supp. at 1232.
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A wholly-owned subsidiary"' of the union's health and welfare
fund was paying (1) salaries of field representatives who performed
substantial work for the union but received no remuneration from
it, (2) the salary of an employee who chauffeured union leaders but
was not paid by the union, and (3) rent for office space that was used
primarily by the union.80 Moreover, the rental payments were far in
excess of any reasonable requirements for plan administration.'
This case exemplifies the situation where the interests of the
union and the fund are inseparable-a circumstance that markedly
increases the chances that fund assets will not be used solely in the
interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.82 Such an overlap-
ping of relationships and sharing of assets constitutes a transaction
specifically forbidden by section 406(a)(1)(C). 3 Accordingly, the
court took measures to ensure that the plan would be administered
in conformity with the terms of the plan instrument and the provi-
sions of ERISA.1'
In Cutaiar v. Marshall,"6 the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit found that the trustees of a Teamsters Welfare Fund had en-
gaged in a prohibited transaction s as defined in section 406 by
borrowing four million dollars from a Teamsters Pension Fund. 7
These welfare and pension funds were jointly administered. Three
of the joint trustees expressed concern about their fiduciary respon-
sibility and objected to authorizing the loan.88 Consequently the
loan was submitted to an impartial referee8" who held that it did not
79. 806 Record Processors, Inc. was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the welfare plan.
80. 430 F. Supp. at 1232.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1231.
84, Id. at 1232. The court suspended the trustee pending the final outcome of the action
and appointed a receiver to manage the fund.
85. No. 78-1380 (3d Cir. 1979).
86. Id. at 11. The trustees violated section 406(b)(2) of ERISA.
87. The welfare fund had a cash flow problem and had to borrow four million dollars to
meet current claims. As the pension fund had ample liquid assets, it seemed advantageous
for those two parties to effect a loan transaction. It was undisputed that the terms of the
transaction were fair and reasonable with respect to both plans. Id. at 3, 9.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. This was submitted to an impartial referee pursuant to section 186(c)(5)(B) of the
Labor-Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act which states that
representatives shall be appointed together with such neutral persons as the represent-
atives of the employers and the representatives of employees may agree upon and in
the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such
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contravene the provisions of ERISA. Following a subsequent inves-
tigation the Secretary of Labor determined that the loan violated
ERISA and so notified the plan trustees. 0 The trustees brought suit
in the district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Secre-
tary of Labor's finding was null and void. When the district court
granted the requested relief, the Secretary of Labor filed an appeal.9
Acknowledging that there was no hint of scandal or self-dealing
in the loan transaction, the court nevertheless found a violation,
albeit a technical one." Seeing the issue as one of basic statutory
construction, the court questioned whether "[section] 406(b)(2)
prohibit[s] transactions adverse in the technical sense . . . or must
a transaction exhibit fiduciary misconduct, reflecting harm to the
beneficiaries, before the statute is violated?"' 3 Using unequivocal
language, the court held that a technical violation was sufficient.
The apparent harshness of this rule is mitigated by section 408(a)
which permits the Secretary of Labor to grant exemptions from the
prohibitions of section 406. Certain criteria must be met before an
exemption is granted, and the extensive procedures which the Sec-
retary must follow before granting an exemption"indicates an intent
to create, in § 406(b), a blanket prohibition of certain transactions,
no matter how fair, unless the statutory exemption procedures are
followed."'" Absent these procedures, plan participants and benefi-
ciaries are entitled to a trustee's undivided loyalty and in a commer-
cial transaction the trustee should be free to negotiate the terms
fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agree-
ment provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such
dispute, or in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an
impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed
by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its
principle office. ...
Id.
90. No. 78-1380, slip op at 4-5. The Secretary's letter to the trustees read in part:
while you were fiduciaries with respect to the Pension Trust, you acted in a 'transaction
involving the plan on behalf of a party (the Welfare Trust) whose interests are adverse
to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries' . . . For
your future guidance, please be advised that we are of the view that any sale or loan
between the two plans as presently administered is violative of 406, and exemptions
under 408 . . .should be sought with regard thereto.
Id.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 9, 11.
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id. at 13.
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most beneficial to his fund. 5
As a result of this decision fiduciaries should carefully evaluate
the basic language of a transaction and not merely appraise the
situation in terms of fairness or sound business practice. For, if the
potential transaction contravenes a literal reading of ERISA, it will
be to no avail that the trustee thought it's terms to be in the best
interests of plan participants. To avoid liability for engaging in a
questionable prohibited transaction, a trustee should take the pre-
caution and apply for an exemption under section 408.
3. Nonfeasance
Although directly engaging in a prohibited transaction obviously
transgresses the law, section 406 can be violated indirectly by a
trustee's failure to act in circumstances calling for positive action.
In Huge v. Old Home Manor, Inc.," the employer had made all the
royalty payments that were due to the trustees of his benefit plan,
but he was consistently late in doing so." The trustees of the plan
sued to compel the employer to pay on a timely basis. The District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that the plan
clearly and unequivocally required payment by the tenth of each
month and that the employer should, therefore, not deviate from
that fixed schedule.' 8
It was noted by the court that the trustees had properly brought
suit to compel the employer to make prompt payments to the fund."
Failure to strictly enforce the fund agreement would have given rise
to the inference that the trustees were extending credit to a party
in interest in violation of section 406(a)(1)(B), or using funds for the
benefit of a party in interest in violation of section 406(a)(1)(D).I""
As this case suggests, trustees can be liable for breaches of fidu-
ciary duty that arise from nonfeasance as well as malfeasance.
ERISA is concerned with preserving the financial soundness of the
pension system in order to protect the individual pensioner, and
affirmative conduct is not the only means by which these interests
may be compromised. If the trustee fails to promote the best inter-
95. Id.
96. 419 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
97. Id. at 1021.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1020-21.
100. Id. at 1021.
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ests of the plan, that his lapse from duty is passive rather than
active could hardly be said to justify insulating him from liability,
nor have the courts held otherwise.
C. Taft-Hartley Trustees
Regulation of pension and welfare plans was not a novel concept
introduced by ERISA; the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)' recognized that pension and welfare plans
had become an important factor in employment stability and the
development of industrial relations. To protect the plan. partici-
pants and interstate commerce the Act required periodic disclosures
and reporting of financial and other information to the plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries.'02 Although these particular provisions of
the Taft-Hartley Act were preempted with the enactment of
ERISA,'13 section 186 of that Act was not affected.
Section 186 broadly proscribes an offer of payment by the em-
ployer to his employee representative as well as a request for such
payment. There are several exemptions from this proscription.
For example, under section 186(c)(5) payment may be rendered
to a trust fund established by an employee representative if certain
conditions are met. The trust fund must be for the exclusive benefit
of the employees, payments must be held in trust for the benefit of
the employees, a written agreement must exist detailing the manner
of payment, and the employers and employees must be equally
represented in the administration of the fund. Provision is made for
an impartial third party who will resolve disputes in case of a dead-
lock among the trustees.'04
Confusion has arisen in pension plans, established pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement, regarding the capacity in which
the trustee serves the plans and its participants. Both ERISA and
the Taft-Hartley Act impose requirements on these trustees. Argua-
bly, the requirements of these Acts are inconsistent. Under ERISA
the trustees clearly owe their allegiance to plan participants and
beneficiaries. 5 Under the Taft-Hartley Act, in contrast, trustees
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970).
102. Id. §§ 301-09 (now repealed).
103. ERISA § 444, 29 U.S.C. § 1144, which specifically repeals sections 301-09 of the Taft-
Hartley Act.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). See note 89 supra.
105. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1974).
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serve as representatives of the parties who appointed them in the
collective bargaining context'016 for section 186(c)(5) of that Act
mandates equal representation of employees and employers in the
administration of pension plan funds. 07 Questions have arisen as to
whether the trustee is to play the dual role of collective bargaining
agent and trustee with ERISA fiduciary obligations. The uncer-
tainty this situation engendered has left a Taft-Hartley trustee with
no definite guidelines as to the propriety of any particular action.
Several lawsuits have emerged in the wake of this uncertainty and
have yielded differing results.
In Associated Contractors v. Laborers International Union,'10
which involved a challenge by employer-appointed trustees of the
validity of certain pension plan amendments, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit recognized the trustees as fiduciaries for the
plan's beneficiaries under ERISA. However, the court also recog-
nized them as collective bargaining agents under the Taft-Hartley
Act to the extent that such status did not interfere with their fidu-
ciary obligations. 1'" To the extent that fiduciary principles are con-
sistent with collective bargaining aims, the trustee should further
the goals of the negotiating party of which he is representative and
by whom he has been appointed."0
This same reasoning governed the outcome in Curren v. Freitag,
in which the employer-appointed trustees of a pension fund sued the
employee-appointed trustees of the same fund."' Counter allega-
tions of improper conduct"' were made by the defendants against
plaintiff Curren, who served in the dual capacity as fund trustee and
as Director of Labor Relations for one of the employer-contractors." 4
Specifically, the defendants accused Curren of violating section
406(b)(2),"6 which prohibits a trustee from acting in any transaction
106, See notes 108-35 infra and accompanying text.
107. See note 104 supra.
108. 559 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1977).
109. Id. at 228.
110. Id.
111. 432 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. 11. 1977).
112. Plaintiffs, employer-appointed trustees brought this suit challenging an audit which
had been allegedly authorized by the fund. Plaintiffs were averring that the audit and subse-
quent lawsuits were not properly authorized but were being used to apply pressure during
labor negotiations.
113. 432 F. Supp. at 670-71.
114. Id. at 671.
115. See note 29 supra.
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involving a pension plan as the representative of a party whose
interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or to the interests
of its participants. Curren had allegedly violated his fiduciary duty
to plan members by improperly advising and counseling various
employer-contractors who were resisting audits and refusing to pay
amounts deemed owing to the pension fund."' The defendants also
averred that by prosecuting this lawsuit, the plaintiff-trustees had
violated section 406(b)(2)" because the benefits derived therefrom
inured to the employers and not the plan beneficiaries."'
Curren highlights the inherent conflict among the ERISA fidu-
ciary provisions,"' the ERISA provisions on prohibited transac-
tions, 20 and Taft-Hartley section 186(c) (5), the equal representation
provision of that Act.'2 ' Whether these clauses are reconcilable with
one another was the initial issue to be resolved in Curren. The court
relied heavily on section 408(c)(3) of ERISA, which provides,
"[njothing in section [406] of this title shall be construed to pro-
hibit any fiduciary from . . .serving as a fiduciary in addition to
being an officer, employee, agent, or other representative of a party
in interest."'2 2 It concluded that Curren had committed no impro-
prieties by performing duties both as a trustee for the fund and as
Director of Labor Relations." 3
Next the court considered the question of whether the activities
that Curren had undertaken for the employer constituted acting on
behalf of an adverse party in a transaction involving the plan pur-
suant to section 406(b)(2).121 Here the court drew a novel distinction,
ruling that unless a fiduciary is actually implementing the interests
of a party adverse to the plan,'25 as opposed to merely giving advice
116. 432 F. Supp. at 671.
117. See note 29 supra.
118. 432 F. Supp. at 673.
119. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1974); see note 23 supra.
120. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1974); see note 29 supra.
121. Labor-Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5); see note
104 supra.
122. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1974).
123. 432 F. Supp. at 671.
124. Id. at 672.
125. The court was cognizant of the Conference Committee's Report which said that the
purpose of section 1106(b)(2) was to prevent "a fiduciary from being put in a position where
he has dual loyalties, and, therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the benefit of a plan's
participants and beneficiaries." Id. The court decided the correct interpretation to be given
section 1106(b)(2) was found in section 1108(c)(3) and not the legislative history. Id.
1979]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
or counsel to such a party, there is no breach of section 406(b)(2).2"
The court then addressed the second counterclaim, which alleged
that the plaintiffs had an improper motive for bringing this law-
suit "7 and therefore were barred from asserting their claim. Viewing
it as unlikely that Congress intended a plaintiff's motivation to have
any significance in a lawsuit where a valid claim was asserted, '
Judge Ackerman stated,
I believe as a matter of law, a fiduciary who seeks to remedy at least colorable
breaches of fiduciary duty by his co-fiduciaries through civil litigation cannot
be said to have violated 29 U.S.C." §1106(b)(2) [section 406(b)(2)] regardless
of this motivation for bringing the action. ERISA does not require a fiduciary
to stand mute because calling attention to breaches of fiduciary duty would
inure to the benefit of the party in interest who secured his position as a
fiduciary.'.
Finally, the court dismissed a claim based on section 406(b)(3),' 30
holding that although Curren drew a salary from the employer-
contractor, this alone could not support a complaint under section
406(b)(3) that Curren had received consideration for his own per-
sonal account from a third party in a transaction involving the
assets of the plan.'3 ' To run afoul of the proscription of section
406(b)(3), the trustee must accept consideration which is in excess
of his usual remuneration as an employee.
Essentially, the Associated Contractors and Curren courts en-
dorsed the view that the Taft-Hartley trustee has a dual personality.
As long as the trustee honors his fiduciary obligations he should be
free to pursue the interests of his employer even in a collective
bargaining context.'32 The purpose of ERISA was to clarify and em-
phasize the fact that common law fiduciary principles apply to all
pension trustees'33 and to cure fiduciary abuses that had arisen in
the industry.'34 These aims would be more easily accomplished by
126. Id.
127. The defendants felt the lawsuit was commenced for the benefit of the employers who
were the only ones who stood to gain if the court were to rule that the audits were improperly
authorized.
128. 432 F. Supp. at 673.
129. Id.
130. See note 29 supra.
131. 432 F. Supp. at 671-72.
132. 559 F.2d at 228.
133. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in (19741 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4649-50.
134. Id. at 5186.
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viewing the Taft-Hartley trustee as a fiduciary with a duty to plan
participants and beneficiaries only. In reality, however, this could
prove impractical particularly since ERISA allows a fiduciary to
function not only in that capacity but also as an officer, employee,
agent, or other representative of a party in interest. 13 5 The trustee's
fiduciary obligations are of paramount importance, but to require
that he forsake all other interests when they have no relation to his
fiduciary duties is unnecessary. Although this dichotomy of roles
was perhaps inevitable for the Taft-Hartley trustee, it should be
emphasized that the trustee's fiduciary duties should nevertheless
be his preeminent concern.
This view of the Taft-Hartley trustee was not espoused by the
Department of Labor, which successfully argued before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in Sheet Metal Workers 36
that the trustees of a Taft-Hartley pension plan were not collective
bargaining agents. 37 The Department of Labor opined that the fidu-
ciary obligations of a trustee under ERISA were diametrically op-
posed to the obligations of a collective bargaining agent.138 Acknowl-
edging that as a fiduciary the trustee possessed discretionary au-
thority, the respondents argued that these discretionary decisions
constituted an extension of the collective bargaining process. 39 In
exercising his discretion the trustee would undoubtedly consider the
opinions of the party who appointed him, and perhaps incorporate
that thinking in his decision. Since the employer and union trustees
would often have disparate views, the trustees' deliberations consti-
tuted a form of negotiation between the parties.4 0
In support of its conclusion that the trustees were not collective
135. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1974).
136. 97 LR.R.M. 1476 (1977).
137. The petitioners alleged a violation of section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act which states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents (1) to restrain or coerce . . .(B) an employer in the selection of his representatives
for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances . . .The petitioner
association alleged that by striking to force the inclusion of the pension fund in the collective
bargaining agreement, the respondents coerced the association in its choice of a collective
bargaining representative. The court found that if the trustees of the plan were indeed collec-
tive bargaining agents there was an undisputed violation of 8(b)(1)(B). The status which the
trustees had in relation to the plan, then, was of paramount consideration in the deliberations
of the Board. Id. at 1484 n.29.
138. Id. at 1485.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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bargaining agents, the NLRB reasoned that if Congress had in-
tended trustees of Taft-Hartley pension plans to be collective bar-
gaining agents, it would have so specified and applied a different
standard to them,' instead, in enacting ERISA, Congress chose to
apply the strict fiduciary standards to all trustees, standards that
emphasize absolute and undivided loyalty to the plan's participants
and beneficiaries. 42
Stating that most courts view Taft-Hartley trustees as fiduciaries
rather than as collective bargaining agents,"' the NLRB unequivo-
cally subscribed to this view."4 Not only were the fiduciary stan-
dards of ERISA applicable to these trustees,' but "there is nothing
in Labor-Management Relations Act [Tart-Hartley Act] or other
federal statutes or in their legislative history which can be said to
alleviate the otherwise strict common-law fiduciary responsibilities
of trustees appointed for employee welfare or pension funds devel-
oped by collective bargaining.""4
Because ERISA permits a trustee to function, then, as an officer,
employee, agent or other representative of a party in interest,"47
ambiguity exists as to the legal position of one who functions in a
dual capacity. ERISA's emphasis on fiduciary responsibilities, cou-
pled with its avowed purpose to make the law of trusts applicable
to the pension industry,"18 leads to the conclusion that a trustee's
foremost duty is to satisfy his fiduciary obligations. If these obliga-
tions are conscientiously fulfilled, there should be no legal obstacle
to a trustee's involvement in other pursuits.
IV. Conclusion
Tremendous growth has characterized the private pension indus-
try during the last decades and increasing numbers of working peo-
ple participate in pension and welfare plans. ERISA was enacted to
preserve the financial integrity of these working people and to en-
sure that American laborers are aware of their pension rights and
141. Id, at 1477.
142. Id,
143. Id. at 1485. See, e.g., Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975); Lamb v. Carey,
498 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
144. 97 L.R.R.M. at 1486.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1485.
147. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1974).
148. Conference Report on H.R. 2, reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 29932 (1974).
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of the standards by which to judge their fiduciary's actions.
The federal courts' initial venture into litigation involving
ERISA's fiduciary provisions has been cautious, a reflection perhaps
of the uncharted terrain of the fiduciary area and of the courts'
awareness of the potential liabilities inherent in the provisions. If
one thread unites these diverse decisions, however, it is the courts'
concern for plan participants and beneficiaries and for the protec-
tion of their plan assets. In this regard the judicial decisions have
been harmonious with ERISA's legislative intent to benefit plan
participants and guard plan assets. It may be that the cornerstone
of federal decisions will be the continued integrity of the pension
system; flexible use of ERISA's fiduciary provisions will help to
achieve that goal. Although a dearth of decisions in this area frus-
trates any prediction of future trends, the willingness of the courts
to protect the assets and participants of pension and welfare funds
seems assured.
Rosemary B. Orr
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